The Chhattisgarh Model
- The
state government in Chhattisgarh has indeed employed many technological
innovations under PDS.
- It
began with computerization of Fair Prices Shops (FPS) and data related
with stocks and sales to enable swift allocation of grains.
- For
ensuring that food grains are delivered to ration shops, “doorstep
delivery” was started wherein GPS-enabled transport vehicles helped
streamline the system through constant tracking.
- Mobile
based applications including SMS alerts for interested beneficiaries were
offered which improved the access to information about food grains lifted
from godowns and their delivery at ration shops.
- At
the village level, i.e., after food grains reach the ration shops, the
reformed system ensured that all information pertaining to beneficiaries
was made public.
- This
was done through painting houses with colour codes signifying kind of
cards held, in the process “naming and shaming” the cases of wrong
inclusion .
- The
list of BPL households was displayed at Panchayat offices too.
- All
these innovations were supported by centralized monitoring and grievance
redressal mechanism in the form of a functioning helpline and access to
information regarding PDS.
- One
of the most important changes brought about by the government was
discontinuing its earlier policy of “privatizing” PDS dealership in
2001.
- While
this privatization was supposed to spread the reach of the FPS network in
the state, it effectively created more incentives for dealers to get
involved in corruption and escape through political connections.
- The
Chhattisgarh Public Distribution System (Control) Order 2004 defined a set
of agencies and institutions eligible for FPS dealership that included
Gram Panchayats, Self-Help Groups etc.
- These
agencies were then provided increased commissions from state government
funds so that they stabilize and recapitalise .
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It is
political will that seems to matter most. Somehow, the PDS became a political
priority in Chhattisgarh and a decision was made to turn it around, instead of
siding with the corrupt dealers who were milking the system. When political
bosses firmly direct the bureaucracy to fix a dysfunctional system, things
begin to change.
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Would Cash Transfers Change
Anything?
- Going
by the pronouncements of the government, the direct cash transfers scheme,
in its pilot stage, has shown great potentials in reducing the subsidy
burden on account of social security programmes.
- In
the case of Kotkasim (Rajasthan) pilot, failures in opening of bank
accounts for beneficiaries and delayed transfer of cash into those bank
accounts led to steep decline in the off-take of kerosene from ration
shops and destruction of PDS infrastructure.
- Compare
these outcomes with the Chhattisgarh experience where a tendency towards
universalisation has led to higher offtake and greater efficiency in
reaching the beneficiaries.
- Universalisation
is often opposed on the grounds of fiscal constraints.
- We
have shown elsewhere that such claims are invalid and dishonest .
- The
overemphasis on targeted PDS is ostensibly aimed at reducing the type I
error in targeting but invariably enhances the type II error with heavy
human and social costs.
- Similarly,
the ubiquitous idea that bogus cards and misclassification of
beneficiaries are the biggest source of corruption in PDS is not supported
by evidence .
- The
Chhattisgarh example shows that the last mile problem can be solved by
simpler technologies such as mobile telephony.
- If
we accept the underlying claim that cash transfer scheme alongwith UID
(Aadhar Enabled Cash Transfers) is system-neutral, the only outcome that
can be ensured, theoretically, is an efficient targeting of subsidies to
the “truly deserving beneficiaries”.
- That,
however, is no guarantee to reach the truly poor and sustenance of social
policies in terms of reducing malnutrition and poverty in rural
India.
- If,
on the other hand, the entire exercise is to dismantle the existing and
already dismal social security infrastructure in the country by reducing
the subsidy bills of the government, the ruling party and the business
media must say so!
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The Chhatisgarh Food Security Bill
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Comparing the Chhattisgarh food security bill with that of the Centre's !
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