Why we don't have our own 'Silicon Valley' and what can be done in that regards ?

Why hasn’t India been able to replicate, even in in some small measure ?

Why haven't Indians been able to create a Google or Facebook in Bangalore?

If there's one thing India is known for abroad, besides poverty, it's the country's prowess in information technology. Its often said that if China is the factory of the world, India is its back office !

Then Why ?

Reasons !!!

• Beginning in the 1980s, Indian tech companies focused on providing relatively low value-added IT services to overseas clients, rather than developing high value-added products.  
• The choice made sense as Companies faced a tough climate for doing business in then-socialist India and a small domestic market. 
• Red tape strangled the hardware sector, as so many others in India; 
• archaic labor laws (presently 44 national and more than 150 state laws are in practice. These multiple laws make the things tougher, time consuming, expensive etc. Hence we need to work on that.)
• lack of power supply.
• Given India's nationalized banking system, financing for risky startups was slim-to-nonexistent.
• India spends only 0.8 percent of its GDP on research and development, compared to 2.8 percent in the U.S. and 1.8 percent in China, both of which have much higher GDPs than India.
• lack of a venture funding ecosystem in India for innovative new startup ideas.
• collaboration between universities and corporate enterprises is still minimal in India.
• even today, India puts out less than 3 percent of the world’s research – and little of that is translated into commercial ventures.

Certain other challenges !!

• India’s Intellectual property rights (IPRs) has been at the clash with the West interest. Our IPRs have been adjusted with the Trade Related aspects of intellectual property right (TRIPS) Agreement. Our trade mark and Copyright have been amended according to feasibility of WTO. Still we need to work for revamping the IPRs, so that the clash with West  be minimized and trade be boosted.

What needs to be done ?

• need to focus on improving the environment for innovation.
• cutting regulations.
• investing in research and education.
• boosting growth in order to expand the domestic market. 

Lets talk positive..what did  new Government do till now ?

• launched the Micro Units Development and Refinance Agency (MUDRA) Bank in order to furnish funds for micro, small and medium enterprises.
• there was an attempt at loosening labor laws.

What needs to be done ..but is being opposed ( u know why ..politics ! )

• Millions of workers went on strike recently, protesting against the proposed labor reforms. 
• The Goods and Services Tax (GST) bill, which will facilitate the movement of goods and services across states, is still stuck in parliament.

Roadmap ?

• India should prepare the ground to create a research-oriented start-up ecosystem, akin to Silicon Valley which could shape up our competitiveness in the global markets.
• build a science park next to a research university, provide subsidies and incentives for startups to locate there, and create a pool of venture funding.
• The traditional STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics) in academics needs to be replaced with STEAM (A for Art). 
• India should not look at just the domestic market, but look to cater services even to developed countries that will face skilled workforce shortage by 2020. 
• India needs to prepare to cater to the demand and aim to be a part of the global supply chain ecosystem through customer credibility.

Moral of the Story !!!

The Silicon Valley in the USA was the meeting point of the American work ethics which focuses on freedom to explore new things, cherishes creativity and sees failures as the stepping stone to success and the heady WWII days of heavy State funding on defense and the institutional support provided by the Stanford University.

To build a Silicon Valley in India the above mentioned work ethics, governmental support and institutional support is needed more than brick and mortar structures. When seen in this perspective Indian IT cities like Bangalore and Hyderabad which at their present levels are more like the backroom office for the global IT majors and therefore devoid intellectual application and original thinking.

Despite the myriad challenges, India still has the population and economy to kickstart a startup revolution. What it needs is the delivery of a long list of reforms and that change in work ethic culture to turn its traders into businessmen and graduates into entrepreneurs.

India's Hubble - The ASTROSAT - Opening the new frontier in Space Technology.

India’s first astronomy satellite will be launched on September 28. ISRO has noted that while it has launched payloads capable of making astronomical observations before, this is the first time one dedicated to astronomy will be launched. 

Firstly, what is a ASTRONOMY SATELLITE ? An astronomy satellite is basically a really big telescope floating in space.  Because it is in orbit above the Earth, the satellite's vision is not clouded by the gases that make up the Earth's atmosphere, and its infrared imaging equipment is not confused by the heat of the Earth.  Astronomy satellites, therefore, can "see" into space up to ten times better than a telescope of similar strength on Earth.  Astronomy satellites have many different applications: they can be used to make star maps they can be used to study mysterious phenomena such as black holes and quasars they can be used to take pictures of the planets in the solar system they can be used to make maps of different planetary surfaces

India’s first astronomy satellite called ASTROSAT, was first scheduled for launch in 2005, then in 2010, and finally in 2015 with delays largely due to putting the scientific payload together. 

• ASTROSAT will be a multi-wavelength mission, observing the cosmos in X-ray, visible and UV light.
• ASTROSAT is one of two scientific missions that have long been overdue – the other being the Aditya-1 mission to study the Sun. 

ASTROSAT comprises five scientific instruments, all of which had been delivered to the ISRO Satellite Centre by 2014. 

• UV Imaging Telescope
• Scanning Sky Monitor
• Cadmium-Zinc-Telluride Imager
• Soft X-ray Telescope and 
• three identical Large Area Xenon Proportional Counters. 

The Soft X-ray Telescope reportedly took 11 years to be built. ASTROSAT cost Rs.178 crore.

Why this astronomical satellite ? Can't we study this from ground ?

• X-ray and UV radiation fall in the short-wavelength part of the electromagnetic spectrum, and their emissions in the universe can’t be detected at ground level because the high-energy photons that constitute the radiation can’t easily penetrate Earth’s atmosphere. The opposite is true for long-wavelength radiation like radio waves. 
• As a result, the most powerful and effective X-ray and gamma-ray satellites are in Earth-orbit whereas radio-telescopes – with their giant telltale antenna dishes – are on ground.

What else ?

• The launch of the spacecraft will be especially beneficial for the Indian astronomical community, as it will reduce the community's dependence on data from external sources like the Hubble. 
• The launch will also make India a member of the exclusive space club of countries with space observatories, which currently includes - U.S., Europe, Russia and Japan. 
• As with the launch of MOM, the scheduled launch of Astrosat will yet again proved to the world, India's space capabilities.

Comparing Astrosat with Hubble Space Telescope !

• One of the better known examples of multi-wavelength space-borne observatories is the Hubble Space Telescope, which makes observations in the UV, visible and infrared parts of the spectrum. 
• However, comparisons between the telescopes are unfounded because Hubble’s optical mirror is eight-times as wide as ASTROSAT’s, allowing for a deeper field of view and much better imaging. 
• Nonetheless, ASTROSAT will be able to contribute in the study of time-variable sources of radiation by being able to observe the sources in UV and X-ray wavelengths simultaneously.

1965 -War - Tashkent -Hajipir - Diplomacy - Lessons to be learnt

अप्रैल 1965 में कच्छ के रन पर हमले के बाद अगस्त में कश्मीर में घुसपैठ प्रारम्भ कर पकिस्तान ने दोनों देशों के मध्य युद्ध की स्थिति उत्पन्न कर दी

 

WHO won the war then ? 

While both India and Pakistan celebrate the golden jubilee of their glorious “victories”, newspaper columns and TV shows in the two countries have belatedly tried to adjudicate the winner. From India’s point of view, this debate is futile. First of all, this debate presupposes that war outcomes are binary in nature. While some commentators have pointed out that 1965 ended in a stalemate, a large body of public opinion thinks of war outcomes as a zero sum game where Pakistan’s loss implies India’s win. This is not necessarily true. Victory—perceived or otherwise—depends on each side’s political objectives, which may not always amount to Clausewitzian destruction of the enemy.

What is important for India is not the war outcome but the lessons we should have learnt from 1965, but sadly we haven’t yet. 

First, 1965 was a huge intelligence failure. 

• Despite the foreboding Rann of Kutch skirmish in April 1965, India failed in anticipating the nefarious Operation Gibraltar being schemed in Pakistan. 
• Fast forward to Kargil in 1999 or Parliament attacks in 2001 or the 26/11 Mumbai episode in 2008, the implications of persistent intelligence lapses are too massive to be ignored. 
• We have repeatedly allowed Pakistan to take us by surprise despite knowing the nature of the Pakistani state rather too well.

Second, Indian forces have had to suffer from poor equipment and ammunition support whether it was 1965 or the Kargil war. 

• During the former, our 1945 vintage Centurion tanks were up against the latest American origin M-47 and M-48 Patton tanks. 
• Three and a half decades later, the Kargil Review Committee catalogued the deficiency of weapons and equipment support for Indian Army jawans. 
• A CAG report tabled in Parliament earlier this year raised questions on India’s ability to fight a 20-day war. 
• The story is worse with paramilitary and police forces which have to deal with insurgents and infiltrators too often. 
• Poor training and equipment of Punjab police was on full public display during the recent Gurdaspur attacks.

Third, the quality of decision-making during times of crisis leaves a lot to be desired. 

• Since the debacle of 1962 was blamed on excessive political interference, 1965 was characterized by inadequate civilian oversight which—according to military historian Srinath Raghavan—was the reason India did not achieve a better outcome. 
• Army chief general J.N. Chaudhuri miscalculated the amount of ammunition left and the number of tanks destroyed, an assessment which prodded Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri to accept the ceasefire under international pressure.

The lessons from 1965 will remain incomplete till the events in Tashkent are understood in entirety. 

Following the cease-fire after the Indo-Pak War of 1965, a Russian sponsored agreement was signed between India and Pakistan in Tashkent on 10 January 1966. 

• India had captured four times the territory Pakistan did during the war. 
• Under Soviet pressure, India ceded all its gains which could have served as leverage with Pakistan in future negotiations. 
• It seemed as if lessons from the adverse fallout of international mediation in Kashmir sought by Jawaharlal Nehru were not yet internalized. 
• K. Shankar Bajpai, who served as secretary to the Indian delegation in Tashkent, recalls, “We went determined not to return them (the captured areas), unless Pakistan agreed to renounce force and accept the ceasefire line as a frontier.” 
• Apparently, the threat of referral to UN Security Council without the cover of Soviet veto did the trick.

Mistake of returning Hajipir !

• Under the agreement, India agreed to return the strategic Haji Pir pass to Pakistan which it had captured in August 1965 against heavy odds and at a huge human cost. 
• The pass connects Poonch and Uri sectors in Jammu and Kashmir and reduces the distance between the two sectors to 15 km whereas the alternate route entails a travel of over 200 km. 

• India got nothing in return except an undertaking by Pakistan to abjure war, an undertaking which meant little as Pakistan never had any intention of  honouring it. 
• Return of the vital Haji Pir pass was a mistake of monumental proportions for which India is suffering to date. 
• In addition to denying a direct link between Poonch and Uri sectors, the pass is being effectively used by Pakistan to sponsor infiltration of terrorists into India. 
• Inability to resist Russian pressure was a manifestation of the boneless Indian foreign policy and shortsighted leadership. 

Analyzing Tashkent as per what K Shanker Bajpai writes in Indian express  !!

The Tashkent Declaration turns 50 in four months. But it fits here, having been forever questioned for returning heroically captured J&K areas. We went determined not to return them, unless Pakistan agreed to renounce force and accept the ceasefire line as a frontier.  

We did face unexpected difficulties: Russia’s skilful diplomacy turned from pro-Indian to even-handed, seeing possibilities of weaning Pakistan away from its then bugbear China. Originally urging the Tashkent meet not for a final settlement but to start a process, Moscow pressed for an agreement there and then, with messages sent through our ambassador warning of a return to the UN Security Council, and without the benefit of a Soviet veto. -

Many states have defied UN resolutions, but that was not our way. Shastriji had his foreign and defence ministers, principal secretary, foreign, home and defence secretaries, as well as the incoming army chief with him. The decision was not one man’s, but of our usual type. But in all fairness, one must remember that diplomacy can only reflect the ground situation, not least the totality of state capability. Some of us dearly preferred other outcomes, but one could do no more at Tashkent than we could on the ground. 

What positives happened due to 1965 experience ?

1. Growth of Indo- Russia relations - Russia not only vetoed against a resolution against India, but also provided her with military hardwares and provided for ceasefire negotiations in Tashkent.

2. The war lifted Indian spirit after defeat against China. It also cut down Pakistan's nerves who had assumed India to be weak.

3. The war coupled with the twin droughts of 1965-66 highlighted India's weakness on food security front. US suspended PL-480 food aid. This incentivised focus towards Green Revolution.

4. The war also accelerated our nuclear programme. Shortly after, we conducted our first nuclear bomb at Pokhran in 1974.

5. War heralded unity between the various factions. PM Lal Bahadur Shastri led at the forefront with his slogans like 'Jai Jawan, Jai Kisan '

Moral of the story --

• Pakistan’s 1965 gamble failed, but we only “scotched the snake, not killed it”. 
• This snake cannot be killed, or even defanged now. We have to immunise ourselves. 
• That means making ourselves so capable as to live with the likely worst, while warily preparing for worse still. 
• Howsoever right an objective, it is feasibility that counts. 
• In 1965, we were economically floundering, militarily weak, politically bickering, and still diplomatically inexperienced. The lessons of 1965 — not to be any of those things — are obvious. So too is our refusal to learn.